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Rethinking Enforcement and Litigation in
Ontario Securities Regulation
Mary Condon*
The Ontario government has recently made changes to provincial securities law that are
aimed at more effective enforcement. For example, statutory civil remedies are now available
to investors in actions involving misrepresentationor inadequate disclosure in the secondary
market. A broader range of sanctioningoptions has also been made available to the Ontario
Securities Commission. The author explores the factors contributing to these developments,
identifies recent controversies surrounding the Commission's enforcement activities, and
evaluates the effectiveness of different approaches to enforcement.
The author reviews policy issues surrounding enforcement through public, criminal and
quasi-criminal sanctions, as well as civil remedies, and places these issues in the context of
academic legal debate. She considers administrative law principles in the context of issues in
securities enforcement, such as apprehensionof bias, 7judicialization"of Commission hearings,
and the diversity ofenforcement efforts across Canada.She then considers whether regulations
should be oriented to deterring violations or creating incentivesfor compliance. She notes that
current incentives to comply with securities regulations may have little influence on employee
and firm behaviour in a competitive business environment. Enforcement mechanisms aimed
at deterrence may therefore be less effective than those seeking to encourage compliance with
regulations.
Since the provisions recently added to the OntarioSecurities Act are aimed at deterrence
rather than compensation, she then discusses whether private enforcement mechanisms, such as
the statutory civil remedies available under that Act, are preferable to public enforcement
mechanisms. The author concludes that public and private mechanisms may be interdependent
and could together achieve effective securitiesregulation.

* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at the 2005 Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium held on
October 14, 2005. The author would like to thank the commentators on that panel
(Michael Code, Kelly McKinnon and Sandra Forbes), Anita Anand, Kim Brooks, Paul
Paton and Jonathan Shanks for their comments.
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Introduction
It has become commonplace to say that enforcement of securities
regulation is currently a subject of intense interest among investors, the

financial press, issuers, market intermediaries and the general public.
Many commentators suggest this is because of various scandals involving

alleged manipulation of accounting and financial information, though I
argue in this paper that the heightened attention to enforcement needs
to be placed in a larger context. Apart from the downstream effects of

various North American corporate scandals, there are other obvious
reasons why this is an opportune time to consider the appropriate role
of enforcement in an overall scheme of securities regulation.1 A new

Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) began his tenure in
2005. Not long after, the Ontario government proclaimed Part XXIII.1

1. The focus of this paper is the role of enforcement in Ontario securities regulation, but
comparative material on enforcement in other Canadian or international contexts will be
discussed where illuminating.
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of the Securities Act' which provides for the first time statutory civil
remedies for investors alleging deficiencies in continuous disclosure
material of reporting issuers.3
Even more interesting than the media attention to enforcement of,
securities regulation is the fact that it has become a contested site of
policy and intellectual debate. This contestation has a number of
dimensions that are explored in this paper. One is a reassessment of
principles of administrative law in the context of OSC enforcement
practices. Second is a debate, taking place at the highest regulatory
levels,4 in the appellate courts and in the academic literature about the
normative goals of sanctioning by securities regulators. Here the
orienting frameworks of two intellectual perspectives on regulatory
enforcement

generally,

and

securities

regulatory

enforcement

specifically, collide. 5 The neo-classical law and economics approach is
deeply committed to the rational actor model of behaviour and the role
of deterrence in influencing those actors.6 In contrast, a socio-legal
2. SecuritiesAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5 [OSA].
3. As discussed later in this paper, the possibility has existed for some time for investors
to sue issuers under securities legislation for deficiencies in the documents used to validate
the initial issuing of securities. See ibid., s. 130. However the practical significance of this
so-called "primary market" for securities pales in comparison to the volume of
transactions taking place in the secondary market, where securities trade among investors
after they have been issued by the entity.
4. See comments by David Wilson, the Chair of the OSC and Christopher Cox, also
appointed Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S. in 2005,
vowing to aggressively enforce securities law and to use criminal sanctions to do so;
Jacquie McNish, "Veteran banking executive appointed OSC head" The Globe and Mail
(23 June 2005) B1; Kevin Drawbaugh, "New SEC chairman to face major policy debate
on crime" The Globe and Mail (2 August 2005) B3.
5. See Lauren B. Edelman & Robin Stryker, "A Sociological Approach to Law and the
Economy" in Nell J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic
Sociology (2d ed.) (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005) 527.
6. Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, "Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality"
(1996) 30 Law & Soc'y Rev. 549. See also the exchange between Daniel Kessler & Steven
D. Levitt, "Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and
Incapacitation" (1999) 42 J.L. & Econ. 343; and Cheryl Marie Webster, Anthony N.
Doob & Franklin E. Zimring, "Proposition 8 and Crime Rates in California: The Case of
the Disappearing Deterrent" (2006) 5 Criminology and Public Policy 417, concerning the
effectiveness of harsh sanctions as a deterrent to criminal activity.
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approach to regulatory enforcement attempts to test empirically the
respective roles of a deterrence model of behaviour and a compliance
model, which focuses on a variety of ways of inducing law-abiding
behaviour.
A third and final arena of debate is the broader question of the
appropriate balance between public and private enforcement of
securities regulatory norms.7 Is it necessary to have a public enforcer of
securities law in the form of an administrative agency, or should we
instead rely more robustly on private parties to enforce their claims
against market participants in court? An important point of departure
here is that public enforcement of securities regulatory norms may have
different normative goals than those of private enforcement.
Specifically, public enforcement is considered to be about punishing
market actors or producing markets that operate with integrity, while
private enforcement is about compensation for investors. Should one of
these goals be privileged over another? Here again there is a clear schism
between law and economics approaches and others, such as a socio-legal
orientation, which favour an ongoing role for public enforcement in
maintaining market integrity.
Writing from a law and economics perspective, La Porta et aL
recently asserted in a study of regulatory arrangements in 49 countries
that there is "little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock
markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and
facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock
markets." 8 In concluding their paper, these authors reinforce this strong
message with the comment that "securities laws matter because they
facilitate private contracting rather than provide for public regulatory
7. I use "public enforcement" as a shorthand expression to capture the various enforcement
resources at the disposal of the OSC as adjudicator or prosecutor, including criminal and
administrative sanctions and civil remedies. I will not deal with the enforcement activities of
a variety of other significant institutions, such as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), like
the Market Regulation Services (RS), the Investment Dealers Association (IDA) or the
Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA). Meanwhile by private enforcement, I mean the
remedies available to investors acting on their own behalf to seek compensation for various
breaches of securities law.
8. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, "What Works in
Securities Law?" (2006) 61 Journal of Finance 1 at 1.
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enforcement. Specifically, we find that several aspects of public
enforcement, such as having an independent and/or focused regulator or
criminal sanctions, do not matter. . .. " From this perspective, robust
regulatory application of administrative and criminal sanctions is a
mistake at a policy level.
This paper canvasses these issues by first mapping recent regulatory
and judicial developments in securities law enforcement in Ontario.
This stock-taking exercise places recent developments in the
enforcement area in the context of a number of background conditions,
as well as the commitment to enforcement demonstrated by the former
Chair of the OSC, David Brown, between 1998 and 2005. It identifies a
number of the current policy-related controversies in which the
enforcement activity of the OSC is embroiled, and examines them
against the backdrop of the academic literature on techniques of
regulatory enforcement. Part II of the paper examines the secondary
market civil liability provisions in the OSA Part XXIII.1 and to the
argument of La Porta et al. that private enforcement of securities law is
preferable to public enforcement on grounds of the former's greater
contribution to the development of stock markets. The conclusion will
try to weave the two strands of the paper into a coherent assessment of
what might work best in enforcing securities law. Ultimately, the
argument of this paper is that the new civil liability provisions will not
significantly diminish the need for public enforcement efforts in the
securities regulatory arena in Ontario. However, in order to be more
effective, deterrence-based enforcement efforts, such as after-the-fact
sanctioning, should be re-oriented towards strategies for developing
.compliance cultures" within market participants.

9. Ibid. at 28-29.
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I. Administrative and Criminal Enforcement of
Ontario Securities Law
A. Surveying the Terrain: The Enforcement Contributionof the "Brown
Years"
As noted above, many commentators date the current heightened
media and public concern about the effectiveness of securities regulation
enforcement from the notorious Enron,'0 WorldCom and other
securities market scandals, with BreX 1n and Nortel providing Canadian
flavour. It should not be forgotten, though, that a number of significant
background factors have shaped the multilevel political and regulatory
response to such scandals.
One of these background factors is the changing nature of retirement
provision in North America, which has contributed to the rise of
powerful pension funds as "repeat players" in securities trading, but has
also turned employees into investors by way of the shift to defined
contribution (DC) pensions in the employer-sponsored pension sector.
DC pensions can require employees to make pension-related decisions
to invest in a variety of investment vehicles. 2 The concern of Canadian
employees contributing to DC plans about the well-being of their
pension-related investments and the adequacy of securities market
regulation more generally is not likely to diminish, even after Enron
fades into the past.
Another background factor is the trend toward firm-based
consolidation on the part of various professional gatekeepers, such as
lawyers, accountants and investment bankers. Such consolidation has
led to concern about conflicts of interest among the gatekeepers who

10. Timothy F. Malloy, "Regulation, Compliance and the Firm" (2003) 76 Temp. L.
Rev. 451.
11. But see Jeffrey Macintosh, "Lessons of Bre-X(?): Some Comments" (1999) 32 Can.
Bus. L.J. 223.
12. Mary Condon, "The Feminization of Pensions? Gender, Political Economy and
Defined Contribution Pensions" in Libby Assassi, Duncan Wigan & Anastasia

Nesvetailova, eds., Global Finance in the New Century: Beyond Deregulation (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan) [forthcoming in 2007].
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advise, audit or offer reputation capital to issuers.'" Yet another factor,
at an even more general level, is the increased significance of the
financial services industry to the productive economy of many
countries. 14
Systemic changes like these provide the context in which the fraud
and incompetence revealed in several large-scale corporate scandals were
interpreted by regulators, media, policy advisors 5 and the general
public.16 The starting point in examining how the Brown-led OSC
responded to these events and trends in securities market operation is
through the legal resources available to accomplish securities regulatory
enforcement in Ontario. These include deployment of the public
interest-based sanctioning power in section 127 of the OSA, Criminal
Code and quasi-criminal action, and the possibility of civil remedies
under section 128.17 These various items in the enforcement lexicon will
be considered in turn below.
B. Prometheus Unbound? The Use of Section 127 Powers by the OSC
A theme of securities regulatory enforcement in the last several years
in Ontario has been the OSC's proactive efforts to obtain a broader
arsenal of potential sanctions upon a finding that the public interest
warrants the application of such a sanction. Recent successes here
include the power to levy administrative penalties, disgorgement and

13. John C. Coffee, "Understanding Enron: It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid" (2002)
57 Bus. Law. 1403 [Coffee, "Understanding Enron"].
14. Richard Minns, The Cold War in Welfare: Stock Markets versus Pensions (London:
Verso, 2001).

15. Wise Persons' Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in
Canada, It's Time (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003).
16. One might add to this the enduring fact of dispersed ownership systems of
governance in North America which put the issuer's managers in the driver's seat. See
John C. Coffee Jr., "A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ"
(2005) CLE Working Paper No. 274, online: Social Science Research Network
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 >.
17. Mary G. Condon, Anita I. Anand & Janis P. Sarra, Securities Law in Canada: Cases
and Commentary (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 2005) c. 11.
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costs.18 It should be noted, though, that the OSC was not the first
provincial securities regulator to obtain such powers under the rubric of
the public interest sanctioning power, and that an argument for
obtaining them in Ontario was to harmonize sanctioning powers across

Canada.
Internally, the OSC has significantly

expanded the role of

enforcement within the regulatory enterprise and has hired many more
enforcement personnel. The agency has considerably more matters

under active investigation than it had at the beginning of David Brown's
tenure. In a May 2004 speech, David Brown made the claim that:
We have made significant strides in improving our enforcement efforts over the past few
years. In fact, the OSC has obtained jail sentences in four of the last five cases in which we
have sought a jail term. In the past four years, we've successfully initiated proceedings or
settled more than 100 separate actions.' 9

The OSC has launched a number of complicated enforcement
proceedings involving insider trading (Donnini ° and ATI
Technologies21 ), mutual fund trading practices (market timing
settlements22), and inadequate prospectus and secondary market
disclosure (YBM 23). The new administrative penalty option was first

exercised against an individual, Andrew Cheung, in early 2005.24
In 2003, I conducted comparative research for the Wise Persons

Committee (WPC) into the use of public interest sanctioning powers by
18. Philip Anisman, "Proposed Amendments to the Ontario Securities Act: An Open
Letter to the Ontario Securities Commission" (1999) 31 Can. Bus. L.J. 272.
19. David A. Brown, Q.C., "A Cooperative Approach to Fighting Economic Crime"
(Remarks delivered at PricewaterhouseCoopers, Toronto, 27 May 2004), online: Ontario
Securities Commission < http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Speeches/sp_20040527_dbeconomic-crime.pdf > at 6.
20. ReDonnini (2002), 25 O.S.C.B. 6225.
21. Re A TI Technologies Inc. (2005), 28 O.S.C.B. 8558; (2004), 27 O.S.C.B. 1194; (2004),
27 O.S.C.B. 6859 [A TI Technologies].
22. See Ontario Securities Commission, "Mutual Fund Market Timing Settlements,"
online: Ontario Securities Commission < http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/HotTopics/FundSettle/
fsindex.jsp >.
23. Re YBMMagnex InternationalInc. (2003), 26 O.S.C.B. 5285 [YBM].
24. Re Cheung (2005), 28 O.S.C.B. 4685.
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securities commissions across Canada. The conclusion of that research
was that over the three-year period investigated (2000-2003),
comparatively speaking, the OSC conducted fewer hearings than other
large commissions, such as the British Columbia Securities Commission
(BCSC), but it did pursue more novel and complicated matters than the
other agencies.25 Meanwhile the Canadian Securities Administrators
(CSA) has recently taken the initiative to provide semi-annual reports
on the enforcement activities of its member commissions, making
comparative data easier to access. 26 This transparency might well have an
impact on the enforcement efforts of individual provinces by allowing
the media and the public to access more readily information about the
numbers and types of enforcement matters being pursued by individual
commissions, as well as how they are being resolved. Commentators
could also make informed assessments about this information, in
particular by putting them into the context of the enforcement
resources available to individual provincial enforcement divisions. 27
In Ontario in the last several years there has been some increase in
enforcement actions targeting gatekeepers, such as accountants (Miller
Bernstein28 and William Andrew Campbell 29), investment bankers
(YBM 3°), and to a lesser extent, lawyers. 1 It has been noted above that
consolidation in the organization of professional service delivery in
capital markets is an important component of systemic change in those
25. Mary Condon, "The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Powers by Securities
Commissions in Canada" in A. Douglas Harris, ed., WPC - Committee to Review the
Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada: Research Studies (Ottawa: Department of

Finance, 2003) online: Wise Persons' Committee < http://www.wise-averties.ca/reports/
WPC_10.pdf > [Condon, "Enforcement Powers"].
26. Canadian Securities Administrators, Report on Enforcement Activities from April 1 to
September 30, 2004 (Montreal: Canadian Securities Administrators, 2004); Canadian
Securities Administrators, Report on Enforcement Activities from October 1, 2004 to March

31, 2005 (Montreal: Canadian Securities Administrators, 2005).
27. See Charles River Associates, "Securities Enforcement in Canada: The Effect of
Multiple Regulators" in A. Douglas Harris, ed., supra note 25.
28. Re Miller Bernstein & PartnersLLP (2005), 28 O.S.C.B. 7093.
29. Re Campbell (2005), 28 O.S.C.B. 1072.
30. Supra note 23.

31. Wilder v. Ontario Securities Commission (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 361 (Div. Ct.); (2001),
53 O.R. (3d) 519 (C.A.).
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markets. It is likely that issues pertaining to the nature and quality of
internal supervision of market actors, or internal information flow
within firms, will likely continue to be a significant source of
enforcement activity, with the scope of this attention broadening to

encompass not just professional gatekeepers or registrants in securities
firms, but also management personnel in reporting issuers.32 In other

words, it is an open question as to whether the OSC will move to
enforce some of the norms with respect to information generation and

certification that have been implemented in the last several years to
provide a Canadian equivalent to the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the
U.S. 33 The adequacy of supervisory controls within market participants
32. See MI 52-109. The Canadian Securities Administrators have proposed initiatives,
known as "national instruments" (NI) and "multilateral instruments" (MI), that have
either been passed by provincial securities regulators or are under consideration.
Information about each of these initiatives can be found at Ontario Securities
Commission, Commission Document, "Ongoing Requirements for Issuers and Insiders"
online:
Ontario
Securities
Commission
< http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/
Rulemaking/Current/rrnpart5 index.jsp#rrn55101 >.
33. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. 5 7201 (2002)) [Sarbanes-Oxley]. These initiatives are colloquially known as
CanSox, and include rules addressed to those providing accounting and auditing services
to public companies, and to those in managerial roles in issuers. The former group of
initiatives includes: NI 52-107 which deals with identifying or restating the requirement
that financial statements be prepared in accordance with Canadian GAAP and that audits
be conducted in accordance with Canadian GAAS; NI 52-108 which establishes the
Canadian Public Accountability Board - the Canadian equivalent of Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that is required to oversee the activities of
"public accounting firms" and auditors of public companies; MI 52-110 which establishes
requirements for the activities and composition of audit committees. The second group of
innovations is addressed rather to management of public companies. These include; MI
52-109, proposed MI 52-111 and NI 58-101 (and NP 58-201). MI 52-109 requires CEOs and
CFOs to certify, on an annual and interim basis, that (i) annual and interim filings do not
contain a misrepresentation, (ii) that disclosure controls and procedures have been designed to
provide reasonable assurance that material information has been made known to these
parties, and (iii) that the CEO and CFO have evaluated the effectiveness of these controls
on an annual basis. See Mary Condon, "Corporate Governance and Securities Regulation:
What's Next?" (Paper presented to the CLPE Conference, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, 20 October 2005) [unpublished]; Julia Dublin, "The David Brown
Years at the Ontario Securities Commission (1998-2005)" in Paul D. Paton, ed., Taking
Stock: Challenge and Change in Securities Regulation: Papers Presented a the 12th Queen's
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was an aspect of Justice Khawly's decision in Rankin, though of course
in the criminal context. The issue was also a feature of the
34
recommendations of the CSA's Task Force report on insider trading,
the settlement agreements reached between the OSC and ATI
Technologies,35 and more recently, Zoran Popovic

6

It may also yet

become relevant in the Portus matter, which as David Brown has
indicated, "[goes] to the adequacy of the investment advice given by
intermediaries to individual investors."37
The OSC has made efforts to systematize and rationalize initial
regulatory consideration of which enforcement matters to pursue. OSC
enforcement staff sort potential offences into the following categories:
[A]busive trading (including market manipulation and insider trading); abusive sales
practices; deficient disclosure (including prospectuses, financial results and material
change reports); failure to file reports; takeover bid issues; registrant misconduct (such as
misappropriation and improper supervision); and sale of unregistered securities. 8

Annual Business Law Symposium (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's Annual Business Law
Symposium, 2005) 2; David Wilson, "Dialogue with the OSC 2005: Setting the Standard"
(Remarks presented at Dialogue with the OSC 2005, 17 November 2005), online: Ontario
Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Speeches/sp_20051117_dw_
dialogue-opening-remarks.pdf >.
34. Insider Trading Task Force, Illegal Insider Trading in Canada:Recommendations on
Prevention, Detection and Deterrence (Calgary: Canadian Securities Administrators,
November 2003).
35. An aspect of the settlement with A 77 Technologies, supra note 21, was that it was
required to provide the OSC with a letter of comfort to confirm that it has instituted
new practices and procedures related to trading and corporate governance matters
consistent with the practices and procedures of other TSX listed companies.
36. In the settlement agreement with Zoran Popovic and DXStorm.Com Inc., the OSC
required the company to implement a Code of Conduct including an insider trading and
reporting policy. See OSC Settlement with Zoran Popovic and Dxstorm. Corn Inc. Approved
Over Failureto FileInsider Trading Reports (2005), 28 O.S.C.B. 4346.
37. David A. Brown, Q.C., Address (Remarks delivered to the Toronto CFA Society 10 May
2005) [unpublished], online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/
About/Speeches/sp_200500510db torontocfasociety.jsp>.
38. Re OSC Staff Notice 11-719 A Risk-Based Approach for More Effective Regulation
(2002), 25 O.S.C.B. 8410 at 8416 [OSC Staff Notice].
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No specific priorities among these categories of offences are
identified. The articulation of case selection criteria39 is a welcome
initiative as a way of structuring the enforcement discretion of the OSC.
Although the approach to enforcement resource allocation seems
sensible, the criteria are couched in relatively general terms and would
benefit from further elaboration. For example, with respect to the
nature of the activities involved, it is indicated that "Staff consider the
categories of market participants involved, such as registrants and nonregistrants, reporting issuers and their officers and directors, as well as
non-reporting issuers and their officers and directors."4" The relevance
of the category of market participant for a case selection decision is
unclear. Will staff be more likely to pursue a case involving a registrant,
a reporting issuer, or a non-reporting issuer? Again, with respect to the
issue of "investigative value," one relevant criterion is described as
whether the "case involves an issue that the Commission has determined
is a high priority issue."41 This lack of clarity is particularly intriguing
with respect to the apprehension of bias issues discussed below, as it is
not made clear how and when the Commission makes such a
determination.
An important similarity across the large securities agencies in Canada
is the frequency with which matters end in settlement rather than going
to a hearing.4 2 This phenomenon, of course, is not unique to
administrative tribunals, but is true of criminal and civil justice more
generally. While it is necessary to conserve enforcement resources, it
does raise the issue of whether settlements contribute to, or derogate
from, the policy goals that the enforcement process is supposed to serve.
For example, if deterrence is indeed one of those goals, it is questionable
whether it is furthered by settlements, which obviously imply that
39. These include: the nature of the activities; impact; urgency; investigative value; other

factors; and diminishing factors.
40. OSC Staff Notice, supra note 38 at 8417.
41. Ibid.
42. Condon, "Enforcement Powers", supra note 25; Philip Anisman, "The Ontario
Securities Commission as Regulator: Adjudication, Fairness and Accountability" in Anita
I. Anand & William F. Flanagan, eds., Conflicts of Interest in CapitalMarket Structures:
Papers Presented at the 10th Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium (Kingston Ont.:
Queen's University, 2003) 101.
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enforcement staff will seek lesser sanctions than might otherwise be
applicable in order to dispose of the matter expeditiously.
C. AdministrativeLaw Norms and Securities Regulatory Enforcement
The visibly enhanced activity in Ontario securities enforcement has
spawned renewed attention to the application of administrative law
norms to enforcement practices. Several specific areas of controversy are
enumerated below.
(i) Apprehension of Bias
The OSC's overlapping functions of investigation, adjudication and
general policy and rule-making, which had long been taken for granted
as aspects of its operation, became an overt source of controversy several
years ago. The controversy likely has a number of sources.43 Chief
among them were the OSC's successful lobbying for increased
administrative sanctioning powers as noted earlier, along with an alleged
"aggressive enforcement policy, " 4 especially with respect to the
45
handling of settlements and the use of the media by enforcement staff.
The controversy was further fuelled by a letter to David Brown
from three former OSC chairs in November 2002, on the topic of
separating the OSC's investigative and adjudicative functions,4 6 and by a
recommendation from the Five Year Review Committee that the
question of the Commission's structure be addressed "on a priority
basis." 47 A "Fairness Committee"4 8 established by the OSC to examine

43. See Anisman, ibid. for a full account of these issues.
44. Coulter A. Osborne, David J. Mullan & Bryan Finlay, "Report of the Fairness
Committee to David A. Brown, Q.C. Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission"
(2004), online: The Ontario Securities Commission < http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/
FiveYearReview/fyr 20040818_fairness-committee.pdf> at 13.
45. Jeffrey Leon, "Administrative Justice and the Ontario Securities Commission:
Balancing Fairness with the Fifth Estate" (2000) 12 The Advocate's E-Brief 1 (September).
46. Osborne etal., supra note 44 at 10.
47. Five Year Review Committee, Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario): Final Report
(Toronto: Minister of Finance, 2003) at 65.
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its structure discovered "overwhelming" evidence in favour of separating
the OSC's adjudicative function from its other responsibilities.49 It
further recommended in March 2004 that the adjudicative function of
the OSC should be separated from its other tasks, and that an Ontario
Securities Tribunal (OST) should be established to make sanction
decisions under the OSA and to hear reviews from SROs.5 ° In a strongly
worded conclusion, the Committee said:
We are satisfied that the nature of the apprehension of bias has become sufficiently acute
as to not only undermine the Commission's adjudicative process, but also the integrity of
the Commission as a whole among the many constituencies that we interviewed. Matters
of institutional loyalty, the involvement of the Chair in the major cases, the increased
penalties, the sense that "the cards are stacked against them," the home-court advantage,
the lengthy criminal law-like trials, and the Commission's aggressive enforcement stance,
which likely will only increase over time, all combine to make a compelling case for a
separate adjudicative body.5'

A similar recommendation was made by the Ontario Legislature's
Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs in late 2004, if
"substantial progress" towards establishing a single regulator was not
made within a year.52 The responsible Minister stated that he had "not
seen a strong argument against" separation.53 In the meantime the
Ontario government appointed a senior legal practitioner, Purdy
Crawford, as head of a panel to further study the design of a "common
regulator" for securities markets across Canada.5 4 In a speech to the
Ontario Legislature on November 14, 2005, Minister Phillips addressed
the topic of a separate OSC tribunal:

48. The Committee was established in February 2003, and its members were Coulter
Osborne, Q.C., David Mullan, and Bryan Finlay.
49. Osborne etal, supra note 44 at 32.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Anisman, supra note 42 at nn. 243-46.
53. Ibid.
54. See Crawford Panel, "Blueprint For A Canadian Securities Commission: Final
Paper" (7 June 2006), online: Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities Regulator
< http://www.crawfordpanel.ca/CrawfordPanel-finalpaper.pdf >.
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[W]e believe this issue is especially relevant to the structure of a common regulator.
Steady progress has been made over the last 12 months toward establishing a single
regulator. In the context of a goal that has been proposed since the 1960's, that progress is
significant. We have asked the Crawford panel to look at the structure of the adjudicative
function in the model they develop, and I look forward to their recommendations. In the
it is important to remember that the independent Fairness
meantime,
5
Committee... found no evidence that OSC hearings have been biased or unfair. "

Thus, the ultimate outcome of this policy debate about structural
change at the OSC is still unknown. As indicated by the above quote
from the Fairness Committee, the proposal for introducing an OST is
based on the idea that it would be valuable to take a "sober second look"
at regulatory decision-making about the investigations and enforcement
matters chosen for formal action. It is perhaps foolhardy to attempt to
mount an argument against apparently enhanced accountability and due
process, especially when the recommendation for a new tribunal comes
from such an august body of experts. It does seem perverse, however,
that intense discussion of the need for a new tribunal arises when the

OSC, by many accounts, is taking its enforcement role more seriously
than it may have in the past. This leads to speculation that complaints
about bias are another weapon in the legal arsenal of respondents and
their lawyers. 56

Leaving aside the political context of these proposals, some of the
justifications proffered by the Fairness Committee for its
55. "Ontario Government Makes Progress on Securities Reform" CNW Group (14
November 2005), online: Ministry of Finance News < http://ogov.newswire.ca/ontario/
GPOE/2005/1 1/14/c4918.html?lmatch = &lang =_e.html >.
56. Some commentators also note an unfortunate coincidence of timing between the
government's acceptance of the recommendations of the Fairness Committee and the
OSC's investigations into the role played by government officials in issuer companies.
Thus, in her paper for the Queen's Business Law Symposium, Dublin, supra note 33 at 15
argues that the government's desire to proceed with bifurcation was a surprising defeat
for David Brown, and one can only speculate that it may have been a manifestation of the
strained relationship with the government that had developed as a result of the fallout
that the OSC's automatic notification process had inadvertently created for Finance
Minister Sorbara in connection with the Royal Group Technologies investigation. In
other words, perceived concerns about OSC's integrity with respect to its exercise of
investigative functions came about in part because of its investigations of government
officials.
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recommendations seem stronger than others. How exactly do we judge
when an enforcement stance is too "aggressive?" Why would we assume
that the members of a new OST would not exhibit their own form of
"institutional loyalty?" If "lengthy criminal law-like trials" are a
problem, how will this situation be improved by a new tribunal? Indeed
one might just as cogently argue that this tendency will increase when
hearings take place before a body that is detached from the day-to-day
business of regulating. In this respect, a salutary reminder is provided by
Kagan's critique of "adversarial legalism" in the U.S. context. He argues
that:
In its prescriptiveness, punitiveness, and formalization of business-government
relationships, American adversarial legalism induces mutual resentment, defensiveness,
and mistrust. It thereby discourages the kind of cooperation that is essential to the full
achievement of regulatory goals, and it gives regulation a bad name, making it more
difficult to adopt justifiable new regulatory programs and rules. That is its most serious
5
consequence. 7

In other words, as I argue further below, we need to pay close
attention to the full range of possible consequences of removing the
adjudicative function from the Commission itself. One possible result
might be that any consequences will be muted by the fact that the
volume of settlements entered into so as to resolve enforcement matters
dwarfs the number of actual hearings under section 127. Indeed, those
concerned about the accountability of the regulator might argue that
"arms-length review" of settlement decisions is even more important
than further independence for hearing decision-makers. But a possible
consequence of creating an arms-length decision-maker is that the hyperproceduralization of regulatory decisions I discuss below will persist and
be enhanced, turning administrative hearings even more into criminaltype trials. As Kagan notes, the higher costs and greater uncertainty that
may result "are borne by the society at large, not merely by regulated
firms."58 Thus, before moving to bifurcate the Commission's
enforcement functions, we should be clear about what "comparative
57. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2001) at 206 [Kagan, AdversarialLegalism].
58. Ibid. at 198.
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advantages" regulatory enforcement can bring to the task of achieving
the statutory mandates enumerated in section 1 of the OSA. One of
these advantages, presumably, is the ability to align emerging norms of
rule and policy making with reactive enforcement decisions. Another is
the capacity of regulatory enforcement to find creative ways to
accomplish "cultures of compliance" within regulated firms - a capacity
which is obviously greater than that of the criminal courts making
episodic sanctioning decisions.
(ii) "Judicialization" of Commission Hearings
As noted by the Fairness Committee, the growing frequency of
lengthy criminal-type trials is a discernible trend in Ontario securities
enforcement. Issues of process in regulatory decision-making have
generated increasing attention from litigators and regulatory subjects.59
The OSC's enthusiasm for proceeding under section 127 of the OSA has
made respondents more skittish about the breadth of the decisionmaking powers under that provision. It is now beyond question that to
sanction under section 127, the OSC does not have to find a breach of a
substantive provision of the Act, as long as its considered opinion is that
it would be in the public interest to make the order.6 ° This has led
respondents to increasingly seek greater clarity about the OSC staff's
intentions, with respect to the allegations being made, at an earlier stage
in the proceedings.
The A TI Technologies matter, which involved allegations of insider
trading against a number of individuals associated with the firm,
illustrates the increasing adversarialness on procedural issues. 6 1 A
motions hearing was requested by respondents' counsel to clarify
whether the evidence on which an order under section 127 can be made

59. James A. Riley & Cathy Singer, "Process and Accountability for the OSC
Enforcement Branch" in Anita I. Anand, Justin A. Connidis & William F. Flanagan, eds.,
Crime in the Corporation: Papers Presented at the 11th Queen's Annual Business Law
Symposium (Kingston Ont.: Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium, 2004) 226;
Anisman, supra note 42.
60. Re Canadian Tire CorporationLimited (1987), 10 O.S.C.B. 857.
61. Supra note 21.
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(in the absence of a finding that there was a substantive breach of the
Act) must be presented to the hearing panel in a way that allows the
respondents to prepare their case properly.62 Interestingly, however, at
that point Staff conceded that they would not request an order under
section 127 if they could not prove a breach of the section 76 insider
trading prohibition. This could be read as a practical example of an
effort being made by OSC enforcement staff, under pressure from
respondents' counsel, to distance themselves from the decision-makers
that ultimately make discretionary public interest determinations under
the OSA.
In the same matter, a further motions hearing was conducted at the
close of the evidence presented by enforcement staff, in which counsel
for one of the respondents requested a nonsuit motion on the basis that
staff had not established a prima facie case against another respondent,
Betty Ho. This was a novel issue for the OSC hearing panel, which
ruled that such a motion could in fact be brought. 63 Following
consideration of the matter, the panel concluded that the respondent
had not discharged the onus to demonstrate that staff had not alleged a
prima facie case, but rather that inferences could reasonably be drawn
from the evidence presented by staff that an offence had been
committed by the respondent. 64 My point here is to illustrate that I
62. In the Matter of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, chapters s.5, As Amended. - and - In
the Matter of A TI Technologies Inc., Kwok Yuen Ho, Betty Ho, Jo-Anne Chang David Stone,
Mary de la Torre, Alan Rae and Sally Daub (2004), 27 O.S.C.B. 6859. One of the
respondents, K.Y. Ho, requested a reconsideration of this issue when the hearing panel
itself was constituted, but this request for reconsideration was refused.
63. It further ruled that, given its discretion to control its own procedure and the
circumstances of the case, it would not require the respondent to be put to an election as
to whether to call evidence prior to considering the nonsuit motion.
64. The OSC Panel's final decision in this matter was released on October 14, 2005. See
In the Matter of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, chapters s.5, As Amended. - and - In the
Matter of A TI Technologies Inc., Kwok Yuen Ho, Betty Ho, Jo-Anne Chang, David Stone,
Mary de la Torre, Alan Rae and Sally Daub (2005), 28 O.S.C.B. 8558. In it the panel
addressed further procedural issues with respect to (i) the burden of proof to be met in a
matter involving a "serious complaint" ("While the standard of proof in administrative
proceedings is the civil standard of the balance of probabilities, Staff conceded that, this
being an alleged violation of subsection 76(1) of the Act, it could only discharge its
burden by clear and convincing proof based on cogent evidence"), and (ii) reliance on
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expect this close attention to procedural issues in the context of section
127 hearings to continue, as respondents increasingly use experienced
litigators to represent them.65
But this enhanced "proceduralization" again raises the policy issue
identified earlier, which is whether we want the regulatory process to
become dominated by Kagan's notion of "adversarial legalism," 6
thereby increasing costs both for respondents and the regulator, as well
as producing uncertainty and further divisiveness in relations between
regulators and the regulated.67 Indeed, we may even be in danger of
forgetting that enforcement is meant to be only one prong of an
integrated regulatory approach. As John Scholz puts it, "public
[regulatory] institutions provide an arena to debate, reinterpret, and
legitimize changes in the standards of corporate conduct required in a
dynamic economy."68
To return to administrative law basics, what are the purported
advantages of giving enforcement powers to a regulatory agency?
Ideally, we give them such powers because they can be more nimble,
more targeted and more specialized than the courts in their approach to
economic or social regulation. Indeed, the exercise of regulatory
discretion (such as the determination of what is in the "public interest")

hearsay evidence in the context of an OSC hearing ("There are numerous rationales for
permitting tribunals to accept hearsay evidence .... The more serious and contentious a
complaint, the more a tribunal in exercising its discretion under subsection 15(1) of the
SPPA, must have regard to the rights of the person who is the subject of the complaint,"
ibid. at para. 13, 21).
65. For another example, see the SCC's decision in Deloitte &Touche LLP v. OSC, 2003
SCC 61, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 713.
66. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism, supra note 57.
67. It is, however, important to remember, as Michael Code points out, that there
remain significant differences between criminal and regulatory proceedings with respect
to, for example, the rules of evidence that apply, the requirement to prove individual
elements of an offence in a criminal context, and the fact that those found guilty in a
regulatory context cannot be jailed. See Michael Code, "Comments on 'Your Money or
Your Life'" (Paper presented at the Queen's Business Law Symposium, 14 October 2005)
[unpublished].
68. John T. Scholz, "Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing
Perspective of Deterrence Theory" (1997) 60 Law and Contemporary Problems 253 at
263.
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can only be justifiable if it is engaged in by individuals with a deep
understanding of the overall regulatory framework to be maximized.
Thus, if the Fairness Committee is correct that "the role of policy in
sanctioning proceedings is limited"69 then this could be a problem since
the main purpose of sanctioning is to further the policy goals of the
statute.
(iii) Is Diversity of Enforcement Efforts Across Canada a Problem?
Reference was made earlier to the types of enforcement actions the
OSC has been recently engaged in under section 127, as well as its
attempt to structure its discretion by way of adopting risk-based criteria
as guides for priority setting. On a national level, there is a larger issue
with respect to the structuring of enforcement discretion. One of the
issues that surfaced during my research for the WPC was the existence
of some fragmentation of enforcement effort among different provinces,
particularly with respect to matters that became the subject of
enforcement hearings under section 127 or its equivalent in other
provinces. For example, B.C. concentrated on illegal distributions, and
to a lesser extent, insider trading, whereas Ontario tended to focus more
on registrant-specific issues. As was acknowledged in the research study,
these contrasts became more subtle when bigger numbers of settlement
agreements in both provinces were factored in, but the issue remains as
to how we should think about the fact that different regulators in
Canada may pursue different enforcement priorities. The easy answer is
that this is to be expected, since regulators respond to features of their
local market environment, but we must consider whether it is desirable
that there could be a perception of differential possibilities to
successfully conduct an illegal distribution in one province rather than
another. The WPC study ultimately recommended that greater
attention be paid to rationalizing enforcement priorities across the
country, so as to develop a concerted multi-provincial approach to the
task of enforcing where appropriate, and to use scarce enforcement
resources more effectively. The CSA is likely to be the most appropriate
venue for sharing information, debating priorities and pursuing multi69. Osborne et a., supra note 44.
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provincial enforcement initiatives. This is particularly important given
that the so-called passport system retains a great deal of provincial
autonomy in enforcement matters."
D. SanctioningPhilosophies: The Punishment Versus Protection
Conundrum
Another controversy related to applying administrative law norms
to enforcement adjudication is the robustness, in practice, of the
distinction between penal and protective objectives in regulatory
sanctioning. The well-known justification for giving sanctioning powers
to a regulatory agency like the OSC is that such powers are necessary
for it to fulfill its overall statutory mandate. In the case of securities
commissions, this has been held to mean that the exercise of sanctioning
powers is legitimate insofar as they contribute to the goal of protecting
investors and capital markets from the harm caused by a variety of
"unfair, improper or fraudulent practices."'" Thus the appropriate
analysis must be future-oriented, focusing on the need to protect the
integrity of the capital markets on a going forward basis rather than
being focused on designing an appropriate punishment for the nefarious
activities being impugned. Conceptually, this is a very hard line to draw,
given that it is occurring in the context of determining sanctions for
particular respondents, following the finding that they engaged in such
behaviour.72

70. See Proposed MI 11-101 Principal Regulator System, Ontario Securities Commission,
supra note 32. A quite different mechanism for structuring enforcement discretion is the
possibility that over time standard setting by the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) will have a trickle-down effect on the enforcement activities of

domestic regulators. This is particularly likely because of the ongoing involvement of
David Brown in IOSCO activities, but will also be because IOSCO is a natural vehicle
for addressing cross-border issues in enforcement, as well as features of the global
economy (such as money laundering) that affect a large number of countries.
71. OSA, supra note 2, s. 1.1. See Committeefor the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority
Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132 at para. 41 and Re
CartawayResources Corp., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 672 [Cartaway].
72. Mary Condon, "Hope Deferred? Comments on Groia and Seaman 'Enron: Fear and

Loathing on Bay Street'" in Anita I. Anand & William F. Flanagan, eds., The Corporation
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In practice too, the nature of the sanctions available to the OSC
under section 127 makes it difficult to distinguish penality from
protection. Does it matter that when the OSC levies an administrative
penalty of $100,000 on an individual found to have engaged in insider
trading, so as to deter that individual (or others) from doing it again and
thereby protect the securities market from such behaviour, the
respondent experiences this outcome as punitive? In addition, such
scenarios raise a constitutional issue, as was flagged by the Fairness
Committee, in the sense that sanctioning powers which carry "truly
penal consequences" may engage the protections of section 11(d) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides for a
presumption of innocence until a hearing before an independent and
impartial tribunal. 3 One possibility is, therefore, that the severity of the
sanctions available to regulators may force a collapse of the analytical
distinction between protection and punishment in a future Supreme
Court of Canada decision on the issue.
The analytical confusion is heightened by the fact that securities
regulators in Ontario have begun to rely heavily on deterrence as the
guiding principle for making public interest-based orders, and we have
noted that the severity of punishment that this is thought to cause is a
significant source of the concern about bias in enforcement decisionmaking. The deterrence-based approach to section 127 decision-making
was sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Cartawaywhen it accepted the
idea that deterrence can be both the basis for severe punishment by
courts and a way to further the enterprise of policing capital markets by
regulators. 74 Thus, Justice LeBel said in Cartaway that "it is reasonable
to view general deterrence as an appropriate, and perhaps necessary,

in the 21st Century: Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's
University, 2002) 258.
73. Osborne et al., supra note 44 at 70; Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. The Committee ultimately

concluded that recent changes in the way cases are allocated to individual Commissioners
of the OSC would probably be sufficient to withstand a s. 11 challenge, such as a
prohibition in the Act on Commissioners acting in both investigatory and adjudicative
capacities in connection with the same proceedings.
74. Supra note 71.
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consideration in making orders that
preventative. 7 5 Furthermore, he asserted:

are

both

protective

and

It may well be that the regulation of market behaviour only works effectively when
securities commissions impose ex post sanctions that deter forward-looking market

participants from engaging in similar wrongdoing. That is a matter that falls squarely
within the expertise of securities commissions, which have a special responsibility in
protecting the public from being defrauded and preserving confidence in our capital
markets.7 6

While this law and economics-inspired perspective on the triggers of
market actor behaviour certainly gives the regulators a green light to
continue to use deterrence as a guiding philosophy of public interest
administrative orders, it may serve to further muddy the waters about
whether there can be a principled distinction between the role of courts
and regulators in sanctioning market participants. It is also likely to fuel
continued complaints about the OSC's multiple roles.
One way out of the conceptual quagmire is to rethink the
commitment to deterrence as the orienting basis for administrative
orders under section 127. Instead, one might propose that enforcement
efforts should be redirected to improving compliance cultures and
outcomes among the variety of market participants regulated by the
Commission.7 7 This argument will be further elaborated later in the
paper, but it leads now to the suggestion that there has in fact been an
underuse of some forms of administrative order by the OSC. Much
attention has been paid to the arrival of the administrative penalty and
the order for disgorgement, and the older registration suspension and
cease trading powers are well established in the Commission's
jurisprudence. What have been less readily employed are the powers to
require market participants to submit to a review of practices or

75. Ibid. at para. 60.

76. Ibid. at para. 62.
77. Donald C. Langevoort, "Monitoring: The Behavioural Economics of Corporate

Compliance with Law" (2002) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 71 [Langevoort, "Monitoring"].
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procedures and to institute change therein," or to
impose terms and
79
recognitions.
or
registrations
existing
on
conditions

. "Monopolyfor Grown-Ups?:80 The Use of CriminalSanctions in
OntarioSecurities Regulation
A variety of Criminal Code provisions address inappropriate activity
in securities markets, such as fraud, fraudulent manipulation of stock
exchange transactions, publishing a false prospectus and the recent
enactment of an insider trading offence. 8 Other amendments to the
Criminal Code have increased the maximum penalties for conviction of
some of these indictable offences. Adding a new prohibition against
insider trading to the arsenal of insider trading sanctions already
provided in provincial statutes is frequently cited as an example of "get
tough" politics at the federal legislative level. Several academic
commentators have persuasively argued that there are significant
problems with the formulation of this provision, making it unlikely
that it will be extensively used to ground criminal convictions.82 The
provision uses a definition of the information whose use is proscribed
that is different from that contained in the OSA, it applies to a broader
class of issuer than the typical Securities Act class, and in particular it
78. A TI Technologies, supra note 21.
79. Re Paradigm CapitalInc. (2004), 27 O.S.C.B. 5790.
80. See comment by Justice Khawly on mergers and acquisitions in R. v. Rankin, [2005]

O.J. No. 3202 at para. 36 (Ct. J.) (QL), [Rankin]. As this paper went to press, Rankin's
conviction was overturned by Justice Nordheimer of the Ontario Superior Court and a
new trial ordered. Ontario Securities Commission News Release, "Andrew Rankin
Convictions Set Aside on Appeal" (9 November 2006), online: Ontario Securities

Commission < http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Media/NewsReleases/2006/nr_20061109_oscrankina.jsp >.
81. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 380-84, 400. See s. 382.1 for the new
offence of insider trading.

82. Mark Gillen, "Recent Developments in Insider Trading Regulation in Canada" in
Anita I. Anand, Justin A. Connidis & William F. Flanagan, eds., Crime in the
Corporation:Papers Presented at the 11th Annual Queen's Business Law Symposium 2004
(Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University, 2004) 142; Anita Anand, "A political bill" National
Post (16 September 2005) FP19 [Anand, "A political bill"]; Coffee, "Understanding
Enron", supranote 13 at 597.
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requires proof of a higher degree of knowledge. Anand also points to
potential constitutional law problems with the Criminal Code
provision, such as a paramountcy problem and the possibility of double
jeopardy. 3
In Ontario, section 122 of the OSA establishes a number of quasicriminal offences: making materially misleading or untrue statements in
evidence or information submitted to the Commission; making such
statements in documents required to be filed under Ontario securities
law, such as prospectuses or takeover bid circulars; and the offence of
"contravening Ontario securities law."84 Section 122 is thus a relatively
broadly-cast provision. In contrast, the proposed British Columbia
Securities Act 5 enumerates a large number of specific infractions for
breaches of specific provisions of the Act. These differences in legislative
approach have been reduced by the introduction in 2005 of sections
126.1 and 126.2 of the OSA. These provisions create new offences
relating to fraud, market manipulation and making misleading or untrue
statements that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect
on the market price or value of a security. One possible result is that
matters involving fraud, market manipulation or making misleading
statements, which would have been the subject of a section 127
administrative hearing will now be dealt with criminally. However,
there are some problems with proceeding in this way.
There has been some increase in Ontario in the use of quasi-criminal
remedies in cases like Harper,6 Atlas Cold Storage,87 and most recently
Rankin,8 8 Discovery Biotech89 and the von A nhalt matter.90 This increase

83. Anand, "A political bill", ibid.
84. Section 122(4) provides for enhanced penalties for contraventions of s. 76, the insider
trading prohibition (supra note 2).
85. Bill 38, amending the current British Columbia Securities Act (BCSA), was passed by
the B.C. government in May 2004, but its proclamation has been deferred until December
31, 2007. SecuritiesAct, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418.
86. Re Harper(2004), 27 O.S.C.B. 3937; R. v. Harper, [2000] O.J. No. 2791 (Ct. J.) (QL)
aff'd [2003] 232 D.L.R. (4th) 738, [2003] O.J. No. 4196 (C.A.) (QL).
87. Re BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. (2001), 24 O.S.C.B. 6969 [Atlas Cold Storage]. Atlas Cold
Storage was a party to the case.
88. Supra note 80.
89. Re Discovery Biotech Inc. (2003), 26 O.S.C.B. 4322.
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is contrary to the alleged "disappearance" of corporate crime in other
contexts,91 although it must be admitted that the frequency of criminal
disposition in Ontario securities matters has historically been very low.
As noted earlier, the current Chairs of the OSC and SEC have indicated
a pre-commitment to the strategy of exacting criminal penalties for
securities-market related infractions.
In practice, there are a number of difficulties associated with using
criminal or quasi-criminal provisions to ground sanctions. One is the
ongoing problem of the time it takes to resolve a criminal matter. It is a
staple of deterrence-based thinking that punishment has to come swiftly
and sharply for maximum effect. Yet this is often precluded by
difficulties of investigation, such as accessing and interpreting large
quantities of documents and obtaining court dates for a variety of pretrial matters. A notorious example is the Livent matter, where several
charges were recently dropped and the trial is expected in spring 2007,
some nine years after allegations of fraud and inaccurate financial
reporting first surfaced.9 2 Similarly, Khawly J. noted in his decision in
Rankin that "justice for the public or Mr. Rankin has not been swift as
this matter has taken four years to come to trial."93
Another pervasive strategic issue for enforcement staff, of course, is
the limitation in the OSA on the use of compelled testimony. Section 13
of the OSA allows enforcement staff to compel testimony in the course
of an investigation, but section 18 goes on to provide that this testimony
may not be admitted in evidence in a prosecution under section 122.
These provisions offer a lot more scope to gather evidence pursuant to a

90. Ontario (Securities Commission) v. von Anhalt, [2005] O.J. No. 247 (Sup. Ct.) (QL)
[von Anhalt]. Outstanding matters include: Re Landen and Diamond (2006), 29 O.S.C.B.
264 (insider trading/tipping); R. v. Felderhof(2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.) (misleading
statements, insider trading); Re Maitland Capital Ltd. et al (2006), 29 O.S.C.B. 7872
(distribution of securities without a prospectus, misleading statements); Re Portus
Alternative Asset Management Inc. et al. (2006), 29 O.S.C.B. 5213 (misleading statements,
distribution of securities without a prospectus).
91. Laureen Snider, "The Sociology of Corporate Crime: An Obituary (Or: Whose
Knowledge Claims have Legs?)" (2000) 4 Theoretical Criminology 169.
92. Paul Waldie & Richard Blackwell, "Several Charges Against Drabinsky Dropped;
Impresario's Trial Should Start in 2007" The Globe andMail (23 September 2005) B5.
93. Supra note 80 at para. 7.
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section 127 hearing than for a quasi-criminal action.94 Relatedly, the
Rankin case illustrates how prosecutors may expose themselves to
criticism in an effort to obtain the cooperation of trial witnesses so as to
sustain a criminal burden of proof.9 5
Interestingly, cases like Harper return us to the question of the
blurring of the distinction between the sanctioning function of courts
and regulators. Following appeals from his original sentence for insider
trading, Harper ended up serving six months imprisonment as well as
paying a fine of two million dollars. On his release from jail, the OSC
made a section 127 order prohibiting him from acting as officer or
director of a reporting issuer for 15 years, and it also issued a cease
trading order against him for the same period. The panel was quite
cognizant of the fact that "since Harper is 60 years of age, 15-year bans
would keep Harper out of the market, in effect, for the rest of his
remaining business life."9 6 In its reasons, the OSC panel was clear that it
viewed its jurisdiction under section 127 as entirely independent of
action taken under other legal provisions, and that "protective and
prophylactic orders should be made, which would also send the message
that any like-minded individuals in circumstances similar to
Harper's ... may be subject to similar prophylactic consequences
97
regarding their access to the capital markets."
Meanwhile, Pur has addressed some of the difficulties involved in
the criminalization strategy. She proposes that judges should receive
"greater education and social context training on the real harms caused
by capital markets misconduct and [on] appropriate sanctions in the

94. Query whether this proposition has been softened by the SCC's decision in R. v
Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, in the sense that Jarvis allows evidence gathered in the course
of an administrative audit to be used pursuant to a criminal matter, as long as the primary
purpose of gathering the evidence was not to impose criminal liability.
95. Supra note 80. See the comments of Khawly J. at paras. 238-243 concerning the views
of the "hardworking, person-on-the-street, investor" about the "deal with Duic."
96. Re Harper,supra note 86 at para. 53.
97. Ibid. at para. 52.
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criminal law context," and that specialized criminal courts for corporate
and white collar crime should be created. "
While these proposals undoubtedly have merit, in the end the
criminalization strategy is likely, for both conceptual and practical
reasons, to have limited effect in bringing about the state of affairs
desired by investors, the public, regulators and law-abiding market
participants. Rather, we need to seriously confront the issue of whether
the blunt instrument of criminal law can succeed in deterring
inappropriate behaviour where the internal organizational incentives
(such as the pressures of competitiveness or forms of compensation) to
behave in such ways are at odds with the strictures of the law.99 This is
not to say that criminal law is not legitimately used to express a
collective sense of outrage and disapproval at the socially irresponsible
and damaging behaviour of some capital market actors but such
denunciatory impulses may be temporally limited and ultimately
insufficient to produce much behaviour modification.

F.Follow the Money?: Section 128 ofthe OSA
Section 128 of the OSA allows the OSC to apply to the courts for a
declaration that a person or company has not complied with or is not
complying with Ontario securities law.1"' It remains a puzzle why this
provision has been used so rarely in Ontario, given the popularity of
similar provisions available in the U.S. to the SEC. 1' One reason is that

98. Poonam Puri, "Enforcement Effectiveness in the Canadian Capital Markets: A Policy
Analysis" (Toronto: Capital Markets Institute, University of Toronto, June 14, 2005) [Puri,
"Enforcement Effectiveness"].
99. Rankin, supra note 80. Note here Justice Khawly's account of the "caliber and
character" of individuals who work in the mergers and acquisitions field. Thus (at para.
192), "That type is no wallflower, he or she is competitive, driven, ambitious, hungry to
learn and earn."
100. If a court makes such a declaration, s. 128(3) enumerates a wide range of orders it
may make, though other unspecified orders may also be made, whether or not a penalty
has been imposed under s. 122 or an order made under s. 127.
101. A recent example of its use has been the von Anhalt, supra note 90, matter where
the OSC brought an application for a declaration of non-compliance under s. 128 based
on a failure to comply with a previous OSC order.
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some of the enumerated orders which can be made by a court can be
made by the OSC itself under section 127. These include prohibiting
someone from being an officer or director of an issuer, requiring
submission to a review of business practices, and disgorgement for
noncompliance with Ontario securities law. Another reason for the
non-use of the provision may have to do with the regulators' assessment
of the specialized expertise of the judges from whom an order would be
sought.
However, one remedial order available to a court under section 128
is the power to "require the person or company to compensate or make
restitution to an aggrieved person or company."" 2 A number of
commentators argue for increased use of this provision in order to
facilitate civil remedies for investors.103 In a presentation to the Standing
Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce on June 16, 2005,
David Brown observed that "it's increasingly apparent that there's a
need to place more emphasis on providing protection to the investor as
a consumer of financial services."1"4 Similarly, speakers at the OSC's
Investor Town Hall, held in May 2005, expressed "a strong desire for
restitution mechanisms for consumers who have suffered a loss as a
result of wrongful actions of market participants."1"5 Brown indicated
that the OSC was examining several ways of pursuing the goal of
allowing investors to "pursue restitution in a timely and affordable
manner. "106 The proposal that the OSC reimagine itself as a facilitator of
investor restitution should, in my view, be evaluated in the context of
two issues. One is the implementation of sections 138.1-14 of the OSA,
which provide enhanced civil remedies to investors with respect to
issuers in the secondary market, to be discussed later in this paper. The
other is the question of the appropriate purposes to be served by
regulatory enforcement. It is to this issue that I now turn.
102. OSA, supra note 2.
103. Puri, "Enforcement Effectiveness", supra note 98; Wojtek Dabrowski, "OSC
Struggles Under Load" NationalPost (Aug 28, 2004) FP1.
104. David A. Brown, "Remarks to Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce" (16 June 2005), online: The Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/
About/Speeches/sp 20050616 db standing-senate-comm.pdf>.
105. Ibid. at 2.
106. Ibid.
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G. What Should Enforcement Do?
The academic literature on regulatory enforcement strategies poses a
tension between two general approaches, a deterrence-based and a
compliance-based strategy. Each of these proceeds from a particular
vision of how targeted individuals or firms operate. Those who propose
deterrence as an optimal strategy argue that it will work because
individuals or firms are rational profit-maximizers, and "violations [will]
occur when the perceived benefits of noncompliance exceed the
anticipated cost of sanctions." °7 In the competing vision, individuals or
firms are generally law-abiding and prepared to follow the "compliance
norm," which is that "legitimate regulation ...ought to be followed."0 8
These alternatives can fuel a variety of empirical studies, designed to test
which vision of individual or firm behaviour seems the most plausible in
specific locations of economic or social regulation. 9 A body of recent
socio-legal research suggests that deterrence-based enforcement strategies
are impoverished as a motivator of individuals and firms. For example,
there is evidence in non-securities regulatory contexts that the
dissemination of information among industry participants about socalled "signal cases," in which deterrence-based sanctions are applied, is
not sufficiently widespread to be the source of compliance with law." °
In a research study that surveyed 233 firms to assess respondents'
knowledge of and attitude to U.S. Environmental Protection Act
enforcement actions, Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan made a
number of relevant findings. They discovered that of far greater
importance than either specific or general deterrence is what they term
"'implicit general deterrence' where the outcome of sustained inspection
and enforcement activity is to inculcate a 'culture of compliance' in
which it was the regulations themselves rather than enforcement action

107. Malloy, supra note 10 at 453.
108. Ibid. at 455.
109. See e.g. Jon Sutinen & K. Kuperan, "A Socio-Economic Theory of Regulatory
Compliance" (1999) 26 International Journal of Social Economics 174.
110. See Dorothy Thornton, Neil A. Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, "General
Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior" (2005) 27 Law & Pol'y 262.
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that had a direct impact on compliance behavior.""' If this is correct, it
suggests that the establishment of proactive standards, rather than
reactive enforcement, is important in influencing regulatory compliance.
Thus, "company managers were not closely attentive to or
knowledgeable about the penalties assessed against violators, generally
underestimating them." 1 2 Gunningham and Kagan conclude that the
relationship of business behaviour to regulatory law and enforcement is
complex, and
not adequately captured by traditional economic models which assume that firms
respond only to short-term economic incentives, including predicted costs of detection
and punishment. In economically advanced democracies, firms are concerned about their
reputations and legitimacy as well, and often are responsive to the norms underlying
regulatory requirements.., a key contribution of regulation is to trigger and direct
managerial commitments - educating them about regulatory concerns and problems,
stimulating proactive measures to review and improve previously established compliance
programs, or the search for more cost-effective modes of achieving regulatory goals." 3

In other words, this empirical research suggests that deterrence as a
philosophy of either criminal or administrative sanctioning has limited
success as a motivator of "good" behaviour among members of an
industry or business sector.
A principal reason for this, according to Malloy, is that insufficient
attention is paid in conventional research to the ways in which a "firm's
internal environment can affect managers' decisions about compliance."" 4
He elaborates:
Deficient routines can undercut the power of deterrence and hobble the compliance
norm's capacity to secure compliance in areas that traditional enforcement cannot reach.
If deficient firm routines are a significant cause of violations, it appears that regulators
could increase compliance by ensuring that the routines are improved. In other words,

111. Neil A. Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, "Regulation and Business Behavior"
(2005) 27 Law and Pol'y 213 at 215.
112. Ibid. at 282.
113. Ibid. at 217.
114. Supra note 10 at 457.
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routine noncompliance is essentially a "management problem," and as such it is an
obvious case for considering direct regulation of the firm's management function."'

Thus Malloy argues that the immediate firm environment in which
employees operate is more consequential for the issue of compliance or
noncompliance than external regulatory influences. If the organizational
incentives framing employee behaviour emphasize
individual
competitiveness or the suppression of negative information, it will be
difficult for legal sanctions to be an effective counterweight. As
Langevoort puts it with respect to the lessons to be drawn from Enron:
[S]uccess in highly competitive business organizations is skewed in the direction of
rewarding those who are highly focused at the business of competing, which of necessity
means the cognitive ability to block out concerns - like difficult ethical problems - that
are likely to be distracting.' 6

Langevoort elaborates on this argument with an example drawn
from the financial services sector. He states:
Imagine... an integrity-based system in a financial services firm that emphasizes the need
to be candid and responsive to customer needs. That sounds very appealing as a way of
building long-term customer loyalty, and one might predict that salespeople would react
positively to the legitimacy of the message. Now, however, introduce a highly
competitive tournament and quota system for salespeople in which pecuniary rewards are
heavily skewed to the top performers and laggards are dealt with harshly ... one can see
how the incentives skew against the values message, simply because of the timing
mismatch between the temporally distant return to the firm from customer loyalty and
7
the immediate carrots and sticks built into the incentive structure."

One could easily replicate this example in the context of a reporting
issuer environment where managerial compensation is tied to the price
of the issuer's shares or where a high share price is necessary to leverage
the firm's future business activities. Significantly, Langevoort argues that
115. Ibid. at 497.
116. Donald C. Langevoort, "The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition:
CorporateIrresponsibilityand the Lessons of Enron" (2002) 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 968 at
971.
117. Langevoort, "Monitoring", supra note 77 at 107.
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legal rules or standards establishing vague or indeterminate requirements
on corporate actors, such as "reasonableness" or "good faith," will be
insufficient to offset the biases created by the firm's ongoing operating
environment. The implication is that a more specific set of regulatory
requirements and/or more pervasive monitoring by regulatory agents is
required to reorient the "culture" of such firms. This all leads to an
argument that the role of regulation should be to foster a compliance
culture that is clear-sighted about the tendencies of internal incentives to
undermine legal rules, and to design enforcement programmes that are
much more fine-grained in their attempts to educate and shape
organizational behaviour.118 As indicated above, there are some signs
that the OSC is aware of this task, such as its recent settlement
agreements, and more generally its proactive efforts to streamline and
enhance corporate governance and internal reporting practices among
issuers."' Much more needs to be done to assess the current incentive
structures within reporting issuers and securities firms and the extent to
which those incentive structures undermine statutory goals, though the
difficulties involved in changing course should not be underestimated. A
further implication of this argument is that the task at hand - finding
ways to change organizational cultures - is more suited to regulators
than it is to courts. It may be objected that if the enforcement task is as

118. At a proactive level, it is clear that this is the impulse behind the introduction of
the various Sarbanes-Oxley requirements in the U.S. (supra note 33) and their equivalents
in Canada, such as MI 52-109 and MI 52-110, supra note 32.
119. Particularly noteworthy is the resolution of the CP Ships matter, which involved
the issuing of a warning letter instead of formal enforcement proceedings where
disclosure of the restatement of financial statements was delayed and insider trading may
have occurred. In cooperating with the OSC, CP Ships established a special committee to
investigate the issues and, among other things, undertook a review and revision of the
company's insider trading and corporate disclosure policies. See Ontario Securities
Commission, News Release/Communiqu., "Credit for Cooperation by a Reporting
Issuer Results in a Caution to CP Ships Rather than the Commencement of Formal
Commission
Securities
Ontario
online:
2005),
(7
July
Proceedings"
< http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/NewsReleases/2005/nr_20050707 osc-cp-ships.jsp >.
Note also David Wilson's comment in his November 17, 2005 speech that with respect to
the regulation of the mutual fund industry, the CSA is considering "a number of policy
initiatives, such as mandated compliance programs." See Wilson, supra note 33 at 5.
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suggested here,12 ° self-regulatory organizations (SROs) are better suited
to it because they are "closer" to the regulatory subjects. Self-regulation
exists, of course, only for certain sectors of the financial services
industry rather than reporting issuers more generally. Nor does its
existence in those sectors undercut the need for policy-level guidance
and oversight by the OSC as the arms-length agency with responsibility
to further the statutory mandate, though it may be that a rational
division of labour between the regulator and SROs, with respect to this
task, could be possible.

II. Civil Remedies in the Secondary Market
A. The Winter of Our Discontent?:ProclaimingSections 138.1-14 of the

OSA
Part XXIII.1 (sections 138.1-138.14) of the OSA was finally
proclaimed at the end of 2005, three years after it first appeared as a set
of legislative amendments. The provisions of this part are heralded as a
major change in securities law in Ontario 121 by allowing investors to sue
issuers and others for inadequate disclosure provided to the secondary
marketplace. Since the secondary market is where the vast majority of
securities trading actually takes place, this provision theoretically opens
the door to the robust involvement of so-called "private attorneys
general" in enforcing the norms of securities law. Thus, it seems that a
reasonable way to proceed would be to identify the policy goals that are
sought by these provisions, and to assess the likelihood of success in

120. I pursue in more detail the issue of what a compliance orientation might look like
in specific securities regulatory enforcement contexts in a research study conducted with
Poonam Purl for the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada. See Mary
Condon & Poonam Puri, "The Role of Compliance in Securities Regulatory
Enforcement" (28 June 2006), online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in

Canada <http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(1)%2OCondonPuri.pdf>.
121. The BCSA, supra note 85, which has been passed by the B.C. legislature but not
proclaimed, also contained provisions with respect to civil remedies for issuer disclosure
inadequacies in the secondary trading markets.
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achieving them, so as to determine whether a policy preference for
either public or private enforcement of securities law is warranted.
B. Policy Goals of Enhanced Civil Remedies
Statutory civil remedies are generally justified as providing an avenue
for compensation for victims of fraud or negligence, typically on terms
more favourable to plaintiffs than common law actions can provide.
They thus represent a legislative commitment to facilitate redress. In the
case of the OSA, a related motivation is to realign the remedies available
in the secondary trading market with those in the primary market,
where OSA section 130 has for several decades allowed investors to sue
issuers and others for misrepresentations in prospectus offering
documents.122 A further goal is to move the availability of secondary
market remedies in Ontario closer to those available in the U.S., an issue
of particular relevance where issuers' securities are interlisted in Canada
and the U.S. 123 A second policy objective is deterrence, based on the

assumption that the rational cost-avoider firm will make increased
efforts to improve the quality of its disclosure in order to avoid being
sued by investors.' 24 Again this is in part an empirical question, both as
to whether business organizations are in fact motivated by deterrence
strategies, and whether the expanded availability of civil suits to
investors will motivate better disclosure. Even more ambitiously, as
noted above, La Porta et aL claim that private enforcement of securities
12 5
law norms can result in the enhanced development of stock markets.

122. See Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc. (2004), B.L.R. (3d) 167 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Danier
Leather].
123. However once ss. 138.1-14 are proclaimed, there will remain significant differences
from the position in the U.S. See R. Yalden, "Legislative Deference and Canadian
Securities Regulators: Lessons from the Debate on Civil Liability for Continuous
Disclosure" (Paper presented at 2004 Consumer and Commercial Law Conference,
Vancouver, October 2004) [unpublished].
124. Ibid. See also James D. Cox, 'Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate
Misconduct" (1997) 60:4 Law & Contmp. Probs. 1. See also Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc v.
Broudo, 125 U.S. 1627 (2005) [Dura Pharm].
125. Supra note 8.
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C. What Do the New ProvisionsInvolve?
The main contours of these provisions are relatively well known, at
least among securities lawyers. Several causes of action are being created.
These include actions in relation to: (i) documents released by a
responsible issuer that contain a misrepresentation;' 26 (ii) public oral
statements containing misrepresentations, if they are made by a person
"with actual, implied or apparent authority to speak on behalf of a
responsible issuer"; 127 and (iii) failure to make timely disclosure.128 Those
obtaining a cause of action include "a person or company who acquires
or disposes" of the issuer's securities between the time the document
was released or public oral statement was made which contained the
misrepresentation and the time the misrepresentation was publicly
corrected.129 In the case of failure to make timely disclosure, a person or
company who acquired or disposed of the securities between the time
the material change was required to be disclosed and its subsequent
disclosure can bring an action. Notably there is no requirement for the
plaintiff(s) to demonstrate reliance on the misrepresentation, or on the
issuer having complied with timely disclosure requirements, in making
the decision to trade the securities. This is obviously a more plaintifffriendly state of affairs than under the various common law remedies
which plaintiffs were required to mobilize with respect to
misrepresentations, in documents released by an issuer, in the secondary
market.
Similarly, the class of defendants to these new causes of action is
broader than the equivalent liability provisions for misrepresentations in
offering documents (in provisions such as section 130 of the OSA). The
class includes not only the responsible issuer, its directors and officers,
but also "influential persons" and, in the case of written or oral
statements, experts. The definition of "influential person" includes, with
respect to responsible issuers, control persons, promoters and insiders

126.
127.
128.
129.

OSA, supra note 2, s. 138.3(1).
Ibid., s. 138.3(2).
Ibid., s. 138.3(4).
Ibid., s. 138.3(1).
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who are not directors or senior officers.13 The expansion of possible
defendants to a section 138.1 action is potentially revolutionary, though
it has attracted little published commentary to date. It derogates from
long held assumptions about the relationship of shareholders qua
shareholders to a corporation, and may impose additional monitoring
duties on key corporate shareholders. However, unless the influential
person released the impugned document or made the public oral
statement, "knowing influence" on the responsible issuer will be
required to ground an action.13 Finally, if the person who made the
public oral statement is not already captured in the above list, he or she
may also be liable. Furthermore, the new provisions make a distinction
between core and non-core documents, 132 and require a higher burden of
proof to be discharged by plaintiffs where non-officer directors and
influential persons are being sued with respect to such non-core
documents. A similarly elevated burden of proof is also required where
directors and influential persons are being sued for failure to make
timely disclosure.
A number of defences are made available by the provisions. These
include a defence that the plaintiff knew of the misrepresentation, as
well as a "reliance on experts" or the making of confidential disclosure
to the regulator. The most significant in practice is likely to be the "due
diligence" defence. With respect to both the due diligence and "plaintiff
knowledge" defences, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants. The
legislative provisions enumerate a variety of factors that should be
considered by a court in determining whether the defendant(s)
undertook a reasonable investigation (or alternatively were guilty of
gross misconduct). One factor that is likely to be most significant in
future litigation is "the existence, if any, and the nature of any system
designed to ensure that the responsible issuer meets its continuous
disclosure obligations." 33 Thus, issuers wishing to position themselves
favourably with respect to possible litigation under Part XXIII. 1 are

130. That is, those who own or exercise control or direction of over more than 10% of

the voting securities of the issuer.
131. OSA, supra note 2, ss. 138.3(1)-(2).
132. The latter category basically comprises material change reports.
133. OSA, supra note 2, s. 138.4(7)(e).
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likely to establish written disclosure policies featuring the establishment
and implementation of procedures for reviewing disclosure documents,
for identifying those responsible for reviewing them and for
determining whether material changes have occurred.'
If the foregoing could fairly be described as plaintiff-friendly, a
number of other features of the provisions tend in the opposite
direction. Chief among these is the so-called "gatekeeper provision,"135
which requires plaintiffs to obtain leave of the court to proceed with the
action.136 Leave is to be granted only where the court is satisfied that the
action is being brought "in good faith" and that there is a "reasonable
possibility" that the action will be resolved in favour of the plaintiff at
trial. A key issue is how robust this merit-based leave assessment will be
in practice.'37 Leon and Armstrong argue that courts should take this
"gatekeeper" function seriously so as to avoid "litigation abuse" while
giving investors an effective remedy. They argue that courts should
strive to avoid situations where companies feel compelled to settle early,
regardless of the merits of the claim. Insofar as private litigation is meant
to deter issuers from providing misleading or inappropriate information,
achieving deterrence will revolve significantly around whether the
phenomenon of meritless settlement is present. In other words, if a
practice of early routine settlement develops, the deterrent effects of
large court-determined awards will be minimized.
Of further significance is the "liability limit" established in the new
provisions,'38 which limits damages payable by a defendant issuer or a
non-individual influential person to the greater of $1 million or 5% of
the issuer's market capitalization. Those payable by an individual
influential person, officer or director, are limited to the greater of
134. Such a development is also being promoted by securities regulators in other ways.
See MI 52-109, supra note 33.
135. Jeffrey S. Leon & Sarah J. Armstrong, "Preparing for the Road Ahead: Bill 198 and
Secondary Market Disclosure," (Paper given at the Insight Information Securities
Litigation Forum, Toronto, 13-14 June 2005) [unpublished].
136. OSA, supra note 2, s. 138.8.
137. Garry Watson, "Class actions and the dilemma of 'Entrepreneurial Lawyering': The
good and the not so good aspects of Class Actions" (2005) [unpublished, archived with
author].
138. OSA, supra note 2, s. 138.7.
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$25,000 or 50% of aggregate compensation received during the 12month period immediately preceding the day on which the
misrepresentation was made or the failure to make timely disclosure
occurred. Liability is also to be proportionate with respect to each
defendant's responsibility for the damages assessed.' 39 These liability
limits make it clear that the compensation goal usually associated with
private litigation is being kept within bounds, since it is conceivable that
plaintiffs may not be able to recover the full extent of their losses. On
the other hand, the fact that liability can be assessed against individual
defendants is presumably designed to contribute to the deterrence
objective of private remedies. 4 °
It is also significant that the liability limits are inapplicable (except
for the responsible issuer) where the plaintiff can prove the defendant's
knowledge of the misrepresentation or failure to make timely
disclosure. As Leon and Armstrong argue,
[tihis provision may well have the effect of encouraging plaintiffs to allege fraud so as to
put pressure on defendants to settle in order to avoid unlimited exposure to damages.
This pressure becomes even more formidable given the potential negative effect on the
ability of directors and officers to depend on insurance to respond to a successful claim.'41

Strategically, then, it will become important whether a court will
determine the likelihood of success on the issue of the defendant's
knowledge at the leave stage.' 42 My own view is that this is probably
unlikely, since evidentiary issues will be paramount. In general, though,
early cases specifying the required elements of proof of the defendant's
knowledge will be significant to the usefulness of these provisions to
disgruntled investors.
With respect to the calculation of losses in order to compute
damages, the provisions do not require plaintiffs to crystallize those
losses by selling the security. 143 A 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision has
139. OSA, supra note 2, s. 138.6.
140. See Keith Johnson, "Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation:
The Role of Institutional Investors" (1997) 60 Law and Contemp. Probs. 155.
141. Supra, note 135 at 6.
142. Sandra Rubin, "Pairing Up for a Payday" NationalPost (7 September 2005) FP9.
143. OSA, supra note 2, s. 138.5(1).
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generated a lot of attention because of its stricter approach to the
requirement for U.S. plaintiffs to prove a causal connection between the
alleged misrepresentation and the economic loss suffered. 44 The U.S.
Supreme Court made it clear that it was seeking to achieve the policy
goal of avoiding "abusive" litigation. However, in Canada the defendant
bears the onus of proving that losses were unrelated to the
misrepresentation.145 This is likely to involve a "battle of experts" on the
issue of what caused the issuer's stock price to decline.' 46
D. Reactions to the New Provisions
Media reports suggest that the Canadian plaintiffs' bar does not
expect that Part XXIII.1 will open the floodgates of securities
litigation."' But one intriguing possibility that has been mooted is that
institutional investors may perceive it necessary to fulfill their fiduciary
duties to their beneficiaries to take full advantage of the new litigation
opportunities. 4 ' In response to this one might argue that we have not
seen a flood of litigation from institutional investors based on existing
statutory remedies like section 130, even since class actions have become
a possibility. It is, however, true that the documents that could form the
basis of such claims are much more sporadic in the life of a reporting
issuer. It is also the case that public and regulatory scrutiny of the
corporate monitoring and internal governance activities of pension
funds and mutual funds, as institutional investors, has been recently
heightened. A scenario of increased involvement by institutional
investors in pursuing litigation for secondary market misrepresentations
144. Dura Pharmaceuticals,supra note 124.
145. OSA, supranote 2, s. 138.5(3).
146. Douglas Worndl, "Opening the Door to Shareholder Class Actions" (Paper given at
the Border Ladner Gervais National Client Seminar Series, Directors' and Officers'
Liability: A New World Order, October 19, 2005) [unpublished].
147. The first suit under the new provisions was filed in September 2006, by a class of
shareholders of IMAX, alleging that there were misrepresentations in financial statements
filed by the company in 2005. See Ron Stang, "IMAX sued under revised securities law"
Law Times (18 September 2006) online: Law Times <http://www.lawtimesnews.com/
index.php?option = com-content&task = view&id = 751&ltemid = 82 >.
148. Rubin, supra note 142 at FP10.
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or inadequate disclosure might raise its own dilemmas with respect to
the ongoing problem of whether securities regulatory norms can meet
the needs of both institutional and individual investors. Will the
enhanced financial and legal resources of institutions to pursue litigation
and settlements against issuers at some point squeeze out individual
investors? A related concern is whether the U.S. plaintiffs' bar will
begin to search for business in Ontario, even as legislative and
jurisprudential attempts have been made in the U.S. to close off a
perceived flood of securities litigation.' 49
E. Will PartXXIII. 1 of the OSA Achieve Its Policy Goals?
Are there features of these provisions that militate against the
achievement of compensatory or deterrence goals? I have noted that the
provisions are designed to place limits on the funds available for
compensating plaintiffs, absent a finding of fraud on the part of
individual defendants. This suggests that the legislators are more
interested in achieving goals of management or key shareholder
deterrence rather than compensation. As to whether the goal of
deterrence will be achieved such that the possibility of being sued will
concentrate the minds of management or individual influential
shareholders engaged in disseminating corporate information, one issue
will be whether the liability caps are pitched at a rigorous enough level
to produce this effect. More generally, it has been argued above that
deterrence appears to be empirically an elusive goal for organizations or
the individuals within them. In the context of litigation, specifically,
there might well be a further concern that deterrence objectives could be
undercut by the availability of directors and officers insurance. Another
key issue will be whether the gatekeeper provisions are successful in
preventing distortion of the underlying policy goals by systemic features
of the class action process. Such features are argued to encourage
"meritless settlement" and a ceding of litigation control from clients to
"entrepreneurial lawyers." Thus Garry Watson points out that "modern

149. Rubin, supra note 142 at FP9; Class Action FairnessAct, 28 U.S.C. 5
and 1711-15 (2005); Dura Pharm, supra note 124.
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1332(d), 1453

opt-out class action regimes, combined with entrepreneurial lawyering"
produce a situation where
litigation is run and controlled by class counsel (because it is effectively 'clientless
litigation'), producing the risk that it may be conducted primarily with a view to
maximizing class counsel's financial return, e.g. the desire to maximize financial returns
may lead counsel to refuse to accept what may, objectively, be reasonable offers of
settlement, which therefore never come before the court for a fairness hearing. Also the
desire to maximize financial returns may lead class counsel to seek a settlement agreement
by which the defendant agrees to pay directly class counsels fees or to support an

application to the codrt that class counsel receive a sizeable fee from the common fund. 5 '

This rather pessimistic account of "noise" in the class action process
suggests that it is a blunt instrument for achieving overarching social or
economic policy goals.

Conclusion
With respect to public enforcement of securities law by the OSC, I
argue that there is insufficient evidence that deterrence is an effective
regulatory strategy to justify the weight that is currently placed on it in
sanctioning, at both the administrative and criminal levels. If in fact it
does not work well enough, regulatory enforcement strategies must be
refocused on preventing or reshaping internal organizational incentives
within securities firms or reporting issuers that run counter to the
public interest and that produce securities law infractions. There likely
remains a residual role for criminal sanctions in terms of their
denunciatory aspect, but this should not consume significant amounts of
enforcement resources.
What about the proposition that private enforcement of securities
norms works better than public enforcement to develop robust
securities markets? Of course the goals of these alternative ways of
pursuing enforcement are different: private enforcement is primarily
about compensating classes of wronged investors, while public
enforcement is about creating and maintaining orderly markets. With

150. Supra note 137 at 6.
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respect to the new civil liability provisions in the OSA, the limits on
compensation and the gatekeeper provisions of sections 138.1-14 appear,
on balance, likely to limit the frequency with which private remedies
will be employed. Conceptually, the results of the research conducted
by La Porta et al. purport to show that common law countries, which
have more comprehensive and investor-friendly rules for private
recovery of damages from courts, also have more "developed" stock
markets."' An empirical question for Ontario will be whether the rules
embedded in Part XXIII.1 will be robust enough to make a significant
contribution to further development of stock markets in the province.
More seriously, a weakness of this research that purports to find a
persuasive relationship between private enforcement rules and the
development of stock markets is that the contours of "development" are
relatively bluntly drawn."' The indicators of development relied upon
by La Porta et al. do not purport to capture more subtle information
about the nature and extent of public or investor confidence in the
integrity of those markets, or, for example, the characteristics of the
investor population in them." 3
Yet La Porta et al.'s paper may, on close investigation, contain the
seeds of an answer to the question of how to assess the relative
importance of public and private enforcement of securities norms in the
current Ontario context. The paper ranks various countries on the basis
of their rules about public or private enforcement of securities law.
Canada"' scores second highest to the U.S. in terms of having rules
151. The level of development of a securities market was measured by a number of
variables, including: ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP; the number of domestic

publicly-traded firms relative to population; and the value of IPOs in each country
relative to GDP. It should be noted that the rules for private recovery they considered in
their research were those relating to misrepresentations in offering documents.
152. Watson, supra note 137.
153. See Mathias M. Siems, 'What does not work in comparing securities laws: a critique
on La Porta et aL's methodology" (2005) International Company and Commercial Law
Review 300, for a critique of their methodology for comparing the characteristics of a
variety of regulatory systems.
154. It is not clear from the paper to what "Canada" refers exactly. The methodology
used to gather information was to ask one attorney from each country surveyed to
complete a questionnaire describing the securities laws applicable to an offering of shares
listed on the country's largest stock exchange in December 2000.
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facilitating private enforcement, in the case of misrepresentations in
offering documents. However, the existence of rules facilitating private
enforcement does not correlate well in Canada with the actual
frequency of litigation. One of the most significant aspects of the Danier
Leather case, where a class of investors sued Danier Leather for alleged
misrepresentations contained in a forecast embedded in a prospectus
document, is that it is the first case based on OSA section 130 to go to
trial in Ontario.'55 With respect to rules facilitating public enforcement,
La Porta et al.'s research ranks Canada third, after Australia, with Hong
Kong, Singapore and the U.S. all in second place. What this suggests
with respect to the U.S. and to some extent Canada, is that both
countries facilitate private and public enforcement of securities law.156
Could it be that public and private enforcement are to some extent
interdependent? In the Ontario context it was the regulatory authorities
who were at the forefront of agitating for statutory civil remedies in the
secondary market, suggesting that they might favour some form of
public/private division of labour in the task of enforcing regulatory
norms against issuers.' 57 On balance, it seems premature to assert that
public regulatory enforcement should be dismissed as making an
unimportant contribution to the maintenance of market integrity in
Ontario. However, it might benefit from recalibration in order to
concentrate on the more systemic organizational features of capital
market actors that contribute to infractions, than either private or
criminal-type enforcement can plausibly address.

155. DanierLeather, supra note 122.
156. Kagan, AdversarialLegalism, supra note 57 at 193.
157. One intriguing possibility is that Part XXIII.1 may become "an enforcement
investigatory tool" in that it requires copies of applications for leave to proceed and any
affidavits to be sent to the OSC when filed. See OSA, supra note 2, s. 138.8(4) and Frank
Newbold & James Douglas, "Selected Issues/Litigation Strategies" (Paper given at the
Border Ladner Gervais National Client Seminar Series, Directors' and Officers' Liability:
A New World Order, October 19, 2005) [unpublished].
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